We investigate how the age of an organization affects its life expectancy. Few, if any, firms survive over time. The main problem is takeover rather than financial failure. Most firms disappear because they are recycled in other firms. Takeover hazard initially declines, and then intensifies as firms grow older. This phenomenon is unrelated to management and industry age, and particularly intensive in high-tech, research-, and capital-intensive industries. Firms seem to have an aging problem.
Introduction
In January 2006, after more than 1,400 years of continuous existence, the Japanese temple builder Kongo Gumi had to file for bankruptcy. According to various media reports, this event marked the final chapter in the history of the oldest firm in the world. Getting older than Methuselah, however, is the exception rather than the rule, also for firms. Most firms find it very difficult to survive. In the U.S., for example, half of the firms listed at some time between 1978
and 2004 were younger than 23 in terms of incorporation age. Fewer than 10 percent of them made it past 83, and the oldest was 280 (see also Fama and French, 2004) . The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the survival problem of firms. We want to know what happens to firms when they get older. Moreover, we want to find out whether age makes firms savvier and able to find ways to improve their odds of survival, or whether it dooms them.
Our investigation would seem to be relevant for theory and practice. At a fundamental level, it would seem to be interesting to know whether organizations age as living organisms do.
That finding would raise the question of what causes young firms to survive and, in contrast,
what induces older firms to ultimately surrender to death. Moreover, it would raise the question of whether failure to survive is an efficient solution to the problem of corporate obsolescence [as in Schumpeter's (1975) creative destruction] or whether letting firms die and be replaced by others is unnecessary and costly.
We study listed firms and define death as the disappearance of legally independent organizations. This definition is also economically meaningful. If the firm is a nexus of contracts that gives one class of residual claimants the right to monitor and renegotiate, then death does indeed occur when the firm loses its legal independence, namely when these contracts cease to exist (financial failure) or when the right to monitor and renegotiate is given to someone else in a different nexus (takeover).
Competitive markets for goods and services sweep away inefficient firms. If so, only the fittest survive. Yet survival threats do not lurk only in the markets for goods and services but also in the market for corporate control. Conceivably, firms could get taken over even when, or perhaps because, they are the best at what they do. We therefore inquire both failure and takeover hazards, and the way these hazards change with age.
The relevance of age in corporate survival has been looked at before, although in different ways from ours. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) , for example, find that life expectancy of individual plants increases with plant age. We are interested in the whole firm and its ability to survive as an independent organization. Similarly, Agarwal and Gort (2002) study the exit hazard of firms from the industry in which they operate. Age is the amount of time spent in any given industry. They find that the hazard of exiting the industry is a U-shaped function of age.
Finally, Shumway (2001) examines the probability of bankruptcy and finds it to be unrelated to firm age.
The evidence shows that, even though death is typically associated with financial failure, that event turns out to be quite infrequent among listed firms at all ages. Failure hazard (a conditional probability) starts at 2.5 percent when firms list, and then it declines by about 0.01
percentage points every year. Aging does not make firms significantly more sophisticated in their ability to avoid failure.
The main hazard that firms are exposed to is takeover. That is the reason why the median listing age of U.S. corporations is only 8 years. Firms do not typically "die," they simply lose their independence very quickly and are recycled in different organizations. Takeover seems to be the mechanism by which resources trapped in outdated structures are freed (Jensen, 2000) .
Whether this corporate reallocation process is economically efficient, however, is an open question.
Takeover hazard starts at an annual rate of 6.5 percent. Around listing age 6, however, it starts declining by about 0.27 percentage points each year, reaching its minimum value of 4.7 percent around listing age 12. This corresponds to a 30 percent decrease. Possibly, young firms are increasingly able to fend for themselves without the help of others. Alternatively, young firms might become progressively more difficult to integrate in different organizations.
Eventually, however, around 20 years after listing and 6 years past the average age, takeover hazard goes back up. Older firms end up attracting takeover or putting themselves up for sale.
Maybe management becomes skeptical about its ability to meet the challenges of competitive markets. Conceivably, this could be due to technical obsolescence of the firm's products and services, as well as to outdated production, marketing, and distribution techniques. It could also be a sign of organizational rigidities and increased rent-seeking behavior within the firm. These phenomena could weaken the firm over time. Rigidities, in particular, can occur because successful firms focus on core capabilities and, in the process, become increasingly unable to adapt to changes in their environment (Leonard-Barton, 1992) .
Consistent with a phenomenon of obsolescence and the existence of rigidities, the effect of age on the probability of takeover is approximately twice as large in high-tech firms than in the full sample. Firms with large R&D and investment outlays exhibit the same characteristic.
Not many firms actually live long enough to experience an accentuation in takeover hazard. Many disappear as part of other organizations before that happens. This is like what we see in nature. Few living organisms actually die of old age; many die of various illnesses before they do reach old age. We find many reasons, besides old age, why firms get taken over, including poor performance and the aging of their industry and management. Firms are therefore constantly reprocessed in other firms, and old age eventually accelerates that phenomenon.
These conclusions apply regardless of whether we measure age from the time of listing or that of incorporation. Moreover, they are robust to different specifications and to different estimation techniques, including one that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The inverted U-shaped takeover-survival pattern implied by the evidence suggests the existence of a life cycle.
Although many papers have referred to corporate life cycles (in finance, for instance, Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Berger and Udell, 1990) , this is the first large-scale study to document anything close to that.
There are alternative explanations to aging for the increase in takeover hazard we uncover, but none is convincing. For example, firm age could be a proxy for industry or management age, but the evidence rejects that possibility. Similarly, Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramaniam (2007) mention that older CEOs might be more inclined to put up their firms for sale. Our numbers, however, are inconsistent with that possibility as well. One could also argue that the increased takeover hazard over time is induced by an intertemporal decline in inside ownership and the fact that inside ownership reduces the likelihood of takeover (Jensen and Warner, 1988; Stulz, Walkling, and Song, 1990 ). Yet this hypothesis is unable to explain why takeover hazard actually declines with age during the initial years after listing. An increase in takeover hazard could also be driven by the increase in takeover defenses observed in older firms (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1999) . The problem with this conjecture is that the probability of takeover is unrelated to shareholder protection (Core, Guay, and Rusticus, 2006) . Finally, perhaps firms differ "genetically" from one another, and some live longer than others (Thompson, 2005) . If so, age would have no causal effect on survival. Yet this hypothesis claims something about the unconditional probability of survival and nothing about the conditional probability. Our evidence refers to the latter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical considerations to structure the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 examines the survival characteristics of firms as a function of age. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations
Recent papers in the finance and industrial organization literature help us structure our empirical investigation. Even though the relevance of age to firm dynamics has attracted comparatively little attention, several papers have documented or discussed its effects. As mentioned above, a number of papers report a positive relation between survival and age, although they work with different measures than those we use. The nature of that relation and its form, however, are debatable. As pointed out in Thompson (2005) , theories that could in principle explain the observed correlation include learning (older firms know more), financial frictions that constrain funding for new projects (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) , and the fact that older firms are possibly active in a larger number of submarkets. We mentioned above that the correlation in question could also reflect selection bias. If firms were heterogeneous in their exit hazards, then, as a cohort of firms ages, the survivors will be those with the lowest propensity to exit, even if the ex-ante exit hazard is unrelated to age (Thompson, 2005) .
The evidence in Agarwal and Gort (1996, 2002) suggests that the relation between age and survival may not be monotonic. Hazard rates seem eventually to pick up with age. One possibility is that the stock of knowledge increases at a decreasing rate (there is a finite stock of information about a technology, and important lessons are learned first). Another is that the adaptability of old endowments diminishes and investment opportunities in new technology shrink as the product market ages. As we said, however, exit in those papers means leaving a particular industry, and age is time spent in the industry.
We want to investigate the relation between age and survival and distinguish between failure and takeover risk. Various papers have made that distinction, yet none has focused on the aging phenomenon. When investigating bankruptcy risk, for example, Shumway (2001) finds no evidence of an age effect. Subsequent studies, such as Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), therefore ignore age. There is, however, a growing strand of the literature that examines exit risks in the context of competing risk models. Failure and takeover risks are competing because the takeover of a poorly performing firm may prevent bankruptcy (Powell and Yawson, 2007) .
In fact, Powell and Yawson (2007) show that ignoring competing risks can lead to estimation bias. Some papers in that literature actually do look at the relevance of age, but they examine foreign data (Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, and Kattuman, 2009) or individual industries (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) .
We use hazard models to gauge whether and how age affects the conditional probability of takeover and failure. (Agarwal and Gort, 1996, 2002) .
For takeover risk, these same control variables apply, except for volatility and stock price.
The literature suggests three additional control variables in this case: firms with larger free cash flows are more likely to become takeover targets (Jensen, 1986 ); high dividend yields should reduce takeover risk (Powell and Yawson, 2007) ; and antitakeover provisions should affect the probability of takeover, although their effect cannot be signed a priori (Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003) .
To account for industry-specific effects, such as industry life-cycles, we also control for the age of the firm's industry (Industry age). Firms that operate in old industries should exhibit higher takeover risk (Jensen, 2000) . For failure hazard, however, the coefficient of industry age cannot be signed a priori. In the empirical section, we also control for the age of managers as well as for ownership structure and antitakeover provisions.
Data

Sample Description
The sample consists of all listed firms with data on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and COMPUSTAT Industry Segment between 1978 and 2004 . Following Berger and Ofek (1995 , among others, we exclude firm-years with total sales of less than USD 20 million, firm-years with missing values for total assets, and firm-years for which the sum of segment sales deviates from total sales by more than 1 percent. Unlike other studies, however, ours includes firms with business segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999). The final sample consists of 10,930 firms and 82,845 firm-years, including 1,669 financials (6,644 firm-years). Schwert (2000) finds that "hostility" is mainly motivated by strategic bargaining to extract higher rents, and that hostile and friendly deals are mostly indistinguishable in economic terms.
As for financial failure, we follow Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and define financial failure as liquidation (400-490), bankruptcy (574), or delisting for financial reasons.
The latter apply when firms are unable to maintain an acceptable share price level (552) or capitalization amount (560 and 584), or when they fail to file financial statements or pay exchange fees (580). Other forms of exit are comparatively infrequent and include exchanges for other securities, switches to other stock exchanges, going-private transactions, or delistings 1 Note, for example, that the sum of firms at the beginning (2,285) plus total new entrants (8,645) minus total exits (7,905), namely 3,025, does not correspond to the number of firms remaining at the end of the period (2,923). The difference is due to the few firms which drop out of the sample because they do not meet our sample selection requirements or because of missing data.
because of an insufficient number of shareholders or market makers. Unlike in the case of takeover and failure, the fate of firms that delist for other reasons is not apparent from CRSP's delisting codes. Such firms may well live on as independent private companies. Therefore, our focus is on takeover and failure.
Insert Table 1 Some of the firms that drop from the exchange in going-private transactions may list again years later. We treat them as separate firms. According to Fama and French (2004) , only 145 firms go public between 1973 and 2001 after having gone private. We come back to this potential sample selection problem in the empirical analysis.
Variable Definitions
We measure firm age alternatively as the number of years (plus one) elapsed since the company's IPO year (listing age) and the number of years (plus one) elapsed since the year of incorporation (incorporation age) (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009 Table 2 shows that average listing and incorporation age is 14 years and 32 years, respectively (the median values are 10 and 23).
Insert Table 2 about here.
Insert Table 3 about here.
As outlined in Section 2, our failure risk analysis follows Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). All variables are measured at year end. We also considered macroeconomic variables such as industry growth and industry concentration, but they are unrelated to failure hazard [see Caves (1998) and the literature reviewed therein]. For our analysis of takeover risk, we add the firm's free cash flow (as defined in Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) , dividend yield, and a binary variable that identifies firms incorporated in Delaware (to control for antitakeover provisions).
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all control variables at the 5th and 95th
percentile of their pooled distribution, as in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) .
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 . Variable definitions are shown in Table 3 .
Firm Age and Survival
Results
This section estimates the relation between age and survival. Our data are discrete, since we know only whether or not exit occurs in a given year. We are thus faced with grouped duration data. To account for this feature of the data, we formulate a discrete time representation of the continuous proportional hazard model known as a complementary log-log model (cloglog model; Jenkins, 2005) .
The first column of Table 4 reports the coefficients of such a cloglog model for the full sample, defining exit as the generic delisting of a given firm and measuring age since the date of listing. To allow for simultaneous hazards, we also estimate competing risk models as outlined in Jenkins (2005) . To this end, we run a pooled multinomial logistic model with the dependent variable equal to zero if the firm survives (the base outcome), one if the firm is taken over, two if the firm fails, and three if the firm leaves the exchange for other reasons. We use the category "other forms of exit" as a possible destination for econometric reasons, even though our focus is on the two categories where the firm loses its independence. The results are shown in columns (2) to (5) of the table. Column (2) looks at takeover risk, column (3) refers to failure risk, column (4) is dedicated to other exits, and column (5) tests for differences in the coefficients of takeover and failure risk. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm
clustering. Throughout the analysis, all regression arguments are lagged by one year with the rationale that exit cannot occur simultaneously with its determining factors. In addition, we include a variable that captures the age of the firm's industry, measured as the median age of all firms in the same SIC 2-digit group (Industry age), as well as a measure of GDP growth to account for the overall state of the economy (GDP growth).
Insert Table 4 about here.
The results show a negative dependence between hazard and age, but a generally positive one with respect to Age 2 . Exit hazard first declines and then intensifies. Since we are controlling for industry effects, this result is firm-specific. The linear effect is always negative and significantly different from zero, regardless of whether we estimate a single destination or a competing-risk model. Moreover, it is statistically indistinguishable across exit reason. In contrast, the coefficient of Age 2 is positive and significant only for takeovers and other exits. As reported at the bottom of the table, the turning point, i.e., the year in which the squared term of age starts dominating the linear one, is around 34 for takeovers and 56 for other exits.
In contrast, financial failure hazard keeps falling over time, even at a relatively old age.
This result is in statistical contradiction with Shumway (2001, p. 122) , who finds no relation between bankruptcy risk and firm age. The effect we find, however, is economically negligible.
Figure 1 (a) illustrates the net impact of age on the two main exit hazards-takeover and failure-based on the multinomial logit regressions in columns (2) and (3) In Figure 1 (b), we use the information of Figure 1 (a) to compute the probability of surviving takeover and, separately, financial failure past a specific age. We also calculate the probability of surviving both hazards. We should stress that all control variables are measured at their average value. We are examining only the effect of age. Accordingly, the probability of surviving takeover falls rapidly with age. It equals 94 percent to make it past the first year, 53 percent to survive the first 10 years, and only 29 percent to reach year 20. The corresponding probabilities of surviving failure are larger although significantly lower than certainty. They equal 98 percent, 78 percent, and 62 percent, respectively. Finally, and not surprisingly, the probabilities of surviving both hazards combined are even lower. Right after the IPO, for example, only 10 percent of the firms can expect to survive beyond age 27.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The fact that few firms survive over time poses an estimation problem. Few firms, for example, live long enough to experience the turning point in takeover hazard. Listing age exceeds the turning point of 34 years in less than 8 percent of the cases. Because of that, there are few exit observations at the higher end of the age spectrum. These observations could have a fortuitous impact on the coefficient of the squared term of Age 2 and the estimated turning point in the relation between age and exit hazard. To find out more about the shape of that relation, we therefore estimate kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions. This nonparametric approach allows for an unspecified nonlinear relation between the two dimensions of interest. We implement that approach for the takeover and the failure hazard.
To control for confounding effects, the dependent variable in the analysis is the residuals from the logistic regressions of the two exit hazards on the control variables from Epanechnikov kernel function with a "rule-of-thumb" bandwidth estimator and local-mean smoothing.
The results in Figure 1 (c) and (d) confirm the analysis in Table 4 . To limit the impact of few observations at higher ages further, we truncate the sample at age 35 (Agarwal and Gort, 2002) . We find that both types of hazard decline substantially as firms grow older. They reach the bottom around listing age 20, which is roughly 14 years earlier than the estimated turning point in Table 4 . Approximately 25 percent of all firms make it to that age. Thereafter, the hazards increase until around age 30-the 90 th percentile of the age distribution. And later still, for the really old firms in the sample, hazards bounce around (not shown). Given the paucity of hazard events at the far end of the age distribution, we choose a conservative interpretation of the 2 Listing age is truncated from above by construction. At the start of the sample, as we said, maximum age is 54; at the end, it is 80.
results, namely, that hazard has a U-shaped form at least in the case of takeover hazard. We come back to this issue in the robustness section.
In addition to the age-related patters, the results in Table 4 suggest the presence of many other factors that affect takeover and failure hazards. For instance, we find that firms in relatively old industries are less likely to become takeover targets. The negative coefficient of Industry age implies that, holding all other variables at their median value, takeover hazard declines by 0.44 percentage points for each additional year of industry age. In untabulated regressions we also add the squared value of Industry age. Its effect is positive and significant with confidence 0.99 on takeover hazard, supporting Jensen's (2000) claim that the takeover mechanism eventually frees resources trapped in mature industries. The estimated turning point is around industry age 18. For failure hazard and other exits, the coefficient of Industry age 2 is statistically zero. The coefficients of Age and Age 2 are unaffected.
The coefficients of the other control variables are generally in line with previous studies.
Since column (5) of Table 4 reveals significant differences in these coefficients across hazard types, we focus our discussion on the results of the competing risk model in columns (2) and (3).
Let's begin with takeover risk. Consistent with the notion that the market for corporate control disciplines and weeds out poor performers (Jensen, 1986) , Profitability is negatively related to takeover risk. Moreover, and consistent with Palepu (1986) , firms that hold large amounts of cash (Liquidity) are exposed to increased takeover risk. Schwert, 1995) .
With respect to failure risk, all coefficients are as predicted by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) . In addition to that, the data indicate that firms which generate large free cash flows are less likely to default.
Robustness Tests
This section inquires into the robustness of the relation between firm age and exit hazard.
We ask whether the observed results for takeover and failure risk depend on our definition of age, inquire into a piecewise linear specification of the age effect, control for unobserved heterogeneity, test whether our conclusions depend on how competitive the industry is, and exclude young and small firms.
Incorporation Age
An alternative measure of age besides listing age is incorporation age, namely the number of years (plus one) elapsed since the year of incorporation. As mentioned before, this information is from Mergent Webreports for a random sample of 5,000 firms. Panel A of The results are similar to those shown in Table 4 . The only noteworthy difference from Table 4 is that the results for failure hazard become statistically somewhat stronger. In this case, the two age covariates are significant with confidence 0.99, suggesting a U-shaped relation with age also in the case of financial failure. Moreover, measuring the control variables at their median values, we find that age has the same marginal impact on both failure and takeover hazard, namely a decline of 0.15 percentage points during the initial years of corporate life.
Insert Table 5 about here.
The estimated turning points in columns 2 and 3 are around incorporation age 72 and 63, respectively (not shown). As in the case of listing age, fewer than 10 percent of the firms get old enough to experience the turning point in takeover hazard (approximately 11 percent of the firms experience the turning point in failure hazard). Hence the overall message remains the same:
aging eventually becomes a threat to survival, although most firms disappear before then for other reasons.
Since the findings for listing age and incorporation age are essentially the same, what follows focuses only one age definition. We choose listing age, because it is available for the full sample of firms.
Piecewise Regressions
The kernel regressions in Figure 1 have shown that the relation between age and exit hazard is not exactly U-shaped. The limited number of observed exits at ages beyond the normal life span of corporations might affect the estimation of the nonlinear term in the age relation and the associated turning point in hazard rates. To explore the shape of that relation further, we run piecewise regressions that allow for coefficient changes at ages 5, 12, 22, and 28, respectively.
These are the turning points that most closely match the functional form suggested in the kernel regressions from Figure 1 (c). The results remain qualitatively the same if we use the quartiles of the sample distribution of age as alternative turning points (not shown). In our regressions from Age.13to22 = 6; Age.23to28 = 0; and Age.over28 = 0. The results are shown in Panel B of Table   5 . For brevity, we report only the coefficients of the five age covariates. The results in column 2 confirm the U-shaped relation between firm age and takeover risk. At very young ages (Age.1to5), takeover hazard seems to be unrelated to firm age. As firms grow older (Age.6to12), however, the hazard drops significantly and remains at a relatively low level until about age 22.
Thereafter (Age.23to28), it bounces back during the subsequent 6 years. And after that (Age.over28), it remains unchanged. Failure hazard (column 3) has also a U-shaped, though weaker, relation with age, a finding similar to that documented in Panel A.
The piecewise regressions can be used to gauge the economic significance of our results.
The coefficients imply that takeover risk drops by an annual 0.27 percentage points between ages 6 and 12-from 6.6 to 4.7 percent. This corresponds to a 30 percent decrease. After age 22, the takeover hazard goes back up to approximately 6.3 percent a year. As before, the magnitude of the age effect on failure hazard is less pronounced. It drops from 2.4 to 2.2 percent between ages 13 and 22-an 8 percent decrease. At listing age 28, it is back up at 2.4 percent.
Overall, therefore, the results from the piecewise regressions confirm a concave age-hazard relation in the case of takeover, and a marginally concave relation in the case of financial failure.
For simplicity of exposition, we will continue our investigation with the original specification and measure age with Age and Age 2 .
Unobserved Heterogeneity
To further scrutinize our findings, we use estimation techniques that control for unobserved heterogeneity, a problem we might face because of omitted variables and/or measurement error.
To this end, we implement the nonparametric discrete-mixture model of Heckman and Singer (1984) . To allow for differences between reorganization and default hazard, we estimate separate hazard models for each delisting reason. In doing so, we assume independent exit risks and censor the exit risk not under consideration. Consistent with what we have found so far, takeover risk first decreases as firms grow up and then increases as they age (column 2 of Panel C). Failure risk, however, is unrelated to firm age. The coefficients of the control variables are generally the same as those in Table 4 (not shown).
Differential Rates of Obsolescence
If age pressures firms to seek merger relief or if it forces them into financial failure, we would expect these effects to be exacerbated in industries more exposed to obsolescence.
Assuming products and services are more likely to fall out of date in high-tech industries, we therefore replicate the analysis in Table 4 for firms in high-and low-tech industries, separately.
The definition of these two industries is as in Francis and Schipper (1999, p. 343) . We should mention that the majority of our sample firms do not belong to either of these two industries.
Panel D in Table 5 shows the estimation results. Takeover hazard has a significant relation with age only in the case of high-tech firms. The relation has the concave shape observed in the full sample, but the effect is approximately twice as large. There is no age dependence, however, in the case of low-tech firms, consistent with the notion that corporate aging is a more serious problem in more innovative environments. The table also explores failure hazard. The associated age coefficients are all statistically zero regardless of whether the firms in question are high-tech or low-tech.
In untabulated results, we pursue this investigative logic and ask whether firms with more significant research and development (R&D) expenses are better able to fight obsolescence and remain independent. To this end, we split the sample into firms with high and low R&D expenses relative to the median firm in their 2-digit SIC industry (item 46). The relation between age and takeover hazard is concave in both groups. The age effect, however, is more pronounced in R&D-intensive firms. When estimating that effect with piecewise linear regressions, for example, we find an initial decline that is more than twice the amount observed in firms with low R&D-expenses (0.39 vs. 0.17 percentage points a year between the ages of 6 and 12). Moreover, the subsequent increase in hazard starts earlier, namely between the ages of 13 and 22, compared to the ages of 23 and 28 for firms that are not as R&D intensive. These results suggest that R&D-activities are unable to overcome aging.
Similar results obtain when we split the sample into firms with high and low industryadjusted capital expenditures (net of depreciation). High and low is relative to the industry median. If new investments offset obsolescence, they should help firms remain independent.
Alternatively, older firms could throw good money after bad, which could attract potential acquirers and increase takeover hazard. Piecewise linear regressions show that, takeover hazard drops significantly between the ages of 6 and 12, regardless of capital expenses. There is no difference between the two groups of firms in this respect. Thereafter, between the ages of 23 and 28, however, takeover hazard picks up significantly in firms with high capital expenditures.
There is no corresponding increase in firms that invest less-the marginal effects in question are 0.36 and 0.06 percentage points a year, respectively. A possible interpretation is implied by Loderer and Waelchli (2009) , who report that new investments after a listing age of 15 are value destroying. If so, older firms have trouble finding or implementing promising investment projects. The takeover market could therefore be the mechanism that stops wasteful investment behavior.
Additional Robustness Tests
In further robustness tests, we ask whether our results are driven by the youngest or the smallest firms in the sample. To find out, we exclude all firms younger than six or smaller than USD 100 million in market value of total assets. The results (not shown) remain qualitatively the same.
3 They also do not change when we exclude firms that operate in the financial sector.
Moreover, we test whether our results are driven by industries with very high exit rates. To this end, we exclude the top 5 percent of industries in terms of exit rates (industry definitions are based on their 3-digit SIC code). Again, the results do not change (not shown).
Summary and Interpretation
In sum, the results indicate that exit hazard typically decreases early in firms' life and then eventually increases as the firms grow older. Most companies disappear, however, before experiencing a higher age-induced hazard. These conclusions apply mainly for takeover risk.
3
To reach convergence, we had to exclude the dummy variables that identify firms operating in SIC divisions A and J.
The effect is robust and statistically significant. It can also be economically sizable, especially in high-tech firms.
To interpret the aging phenomenon we observe, it is important to keep in mind that we control for performance. Hence the interpretation must develop from the level of that performance. If we interpret reorganizations as transactions to obtain know-how and resources from other firms, the results suggest that, initially, firms become less dependent on outside help.
They learn how to reach a given level of performance consistently on their own. They also fail (very) marginally less often in the absence of that help. Eventually, however, these abilities seem to fade away either because older firms feel they are doomed and in need of external help or because conflicts among their rent-seeking factions jeopardize the future of these firms.
We also find that better performance reduces both types of hazard. This is consistent with
Darwin's notion of survival of the fittest. One could argue that, in the long run, only the fittest firms manage to outlive the competition and to stay out of the grasp of the "economic grim reaper" (Baker and Kennedy, 2002) . However, since performance gets worse with age (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009 ), survivors are not unconditionally better, but only better in the cohort of firms of similar age.
Alternative Interpretations
Loderer and Waelchli (2009) CEOs, this could, in principle, explain why takeover hazard eventually intensifies. By itself, however, this hypothesis cannot explain why takeover hazard falls in early years.
Ownership structure could also play a role. According to Jensen and Warner (1988) and Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990) , among others, the likelihood of a takeover is negatively related to inside ownership. Since ownership concentration falls over time, takeover hazard could go up in time as well. Again, this hypothesis cannot explain why takeover initially declines. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if antitakeover provisions accumulate over time, performance will suffer and raise the probability of financial failure.
5
To control for these potentially confounding effects, we add three control variables to our standard model from Table 4 . CEO age is the age of the firm's CEO, in years. The information is from RiskMetrics. Inside ownership is the cumulative fraction of shares controlled by the firm's officers and directors. This information is from Dlugosz, Fahlenbach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006) . Governance index is the firm's score on Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) governance index. 6 We find matching information for 895 firms (3,238 firm-years).
4
As Panel C of Table 5 has shown, however, the effect does not work its way through unobserved heterogeneity, since the age relation survives estimation techniques that control for unobserved heterogeneity.
5
So far, our control variable for antitakeover provisions was the Delaware binary variable for firms incorporated in Delaware. Unlike Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) index, this variable does not allow for intertemporal changes in takeover protection (unless a firm changes its state of incorporation).
6
The index is provided on a bi-or triannual basis. To increase sample size, we interpolate the index for the missing sample years.
The results in Table 6 show that the age effect cannot be explained by older managers, lower inside ownership, or weaker shareholder protection. Columns (1) and (3) replicate the analysis in Table 4 for the sample of 895 firms with the necessary information. Columns (2) and (4) show the calculations for the expanded regression specification. Columns (1) and (2) apply to takeover risk, whereas columns (3) and (4) do so to failure risk. For brevity, we report only the coefficients of the age covariates and the additional control variables.
Insert Table 6 about here.
We still find a U-shaped relation between age and takeover risk. The marginal impact of age is smaller than that reported in Table 4 . As the first column shows, however, the reason is sample-specific. The original specification yields lower coefficients as well (column (1)). The results remain the same if we control for the age of the firms' directors, use alternative measures of ownership structure, and allow for a non-linear relation between ownership structure and takeover risk. In line with Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramaniam (2007), we find that takeover frequency is unrelated to CEO age. Moreover, and consistent with Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), firms with high G-index scores-so called "dictatorships"-do not exhibit lower takeover probabilities. Moreover, takeover hazard seems to be marginally higher in firms with high inside ownership.
With regard to failure hazard, we find no relation with firm age. Yet we observe only 22
failures in the matched sample. Hence, this result must be interpreted with caution.
Interestingly, higher inside ownership reduces failure hazard, possibly because blockholders are more willing to provide additional financing when the firm needs it.
Overall, it is difficult to claim that the age-hazard relation is a surrogate for an underlying relation between takeover hazard and manager age, ownership concentration, or shareholder rights. Failure hazard is weak to begin with in the original sample, and it remains so in Table 6 .
Conclusions
Firms are unable to live forever. According to our findings, this happens not so much because they go bankrupt and are liquidated, but rather because they are taken over and are absorbed in new organizations. The chances of survival rise during the firm's youth and then decline. It seems that, initially, firms are able to do things on their own. Later, however, when they reach old age, they increasingly turn to others for help. Of course, since takeover hazard is economically significant from the start, not many firms make it to old age. But those that do show the signs one generally associates with old age. Performance slows down (Loderer and Waelchli, 2009 ) and they become more prone to initiate or accept takeover. In contrast, age has little if any effect on failure hazard. It could be that firms prefer takeover before having to surrender to the economic grim reaper. If organizational capital is valuable, takeover might be a better solution to liquidation.
The results are most pronounced in high-tech industries, possibly because of the competitive environment. Moreover, they hold regardless of whether we measure age from the time of incorporation or listing, and regardless of the hypothesized functional relation with age.
They also remain the same in a battery of robustness tests, including controlling for unobserved page 29
heterogeneity and for firm characteristics such as the dispersion of stock ownership over time and the increased antitakeover protection that older firms put in place.
The results indicate many other reasons why takeover happens, including old management, industry obsolescence, and poor performance. The latter result confirms that the takeover market fulfills an important function, namely that of weeding out poor performers (Jensen, 2000) .
Together with Loderer and Waelchli (2009) , this is the first large-scale study to address the issue of corporate senescence. Yet whereas that paper investigates performance, this one is dedicated to the issue of survival. Further evidence is necessary to convincingly document the existence and characteristics of corporate senescence. We will have to leave the gathering of that evidence to future research. Age is computed as one plus the difference between the year under investigation and the firm's year of birth. The year of birth is computed as the minimum value of: (a) the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes; (b) the first year the firm appears on the COMPUSTAT tapes; and (c) the first year for which we find a link between the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT tapes (based on COMPUSTAT data item LINKDT). For a subsample of randomly selected firms, we also compute age as the number of years (plus one) since incorporation.
Capex
The ratio of capital expenses (DATA178) net of depreciation and amortization charges (DATA14) to the market value of assets. The market value of the assets is approximated by the book value of assets (DATA6) minus the book value of common equity (DATA60) plus the market value of common equity (DATA25 DATA199). The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Delaware
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Otherwise, the variable is set to 0. The data are from COMPUSTAT's quarterly files (INCORP code 10).
Dividend yield
The firm's dividends per share (DATA26) divided by its share price (DATA199). Excess return The firm's annualized stock return minus the annualized return on CRSP's NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted index. The data are from the daily CRSP tapes.
Focus
The Herfindahl index, H E , captures the degree of specialization based on the sales in the firm's different segments, as reported on the COMPUSTAT Segment tapes:
where N is the number of segments, the subscript i identifies the segments, and p i is the fraction of the firm's total sales in the segment in question.
Free cash flow
The firm's free cash flow divided by its market value of assets. In computing the free cash flow we follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) : DATA13 -DATA15 -(DATA16 -DATA35) -DATA19 -DATA21. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Industry age
The median age of all sample firms in the same industry (based on the SIC 2-digit code).
Leverage
The firm's leverage defined as the ratio of total liabilities (DATA181) to the market value of assets. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Liquidity
The firm's cash and short-term investments (DATA1) divided by the market value of assets. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Market-to-book
The ratio of the firm's market value of equity to its book value (DATA60). The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Profitability
The firm's net income (DATA172) divided by the market value of assets. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
ROA
Return on assets computed as the ratio of the firm's operating income before depreciation (DATA13) divided by the book value of total assets (DATA6). To account for industryspecific effects, we measure ROA as absolute deviation from the median industry value (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Size
The log of the ratio of the firm's market capitalization (DATA25 DATA199) to that of CRSP's NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq equal-weighted index. The data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
Stock price
The firm's log price per share (DATA199), truncated above USD 15. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q, computed as the market value of the firm's assets divided by their book value.
To account for industry-specific effects, we measure Tobin's Q as absolute deviation from the median industry value (based on two-digit SIC codes) in any given year. The data are from COMPUSTAT.
Volatility
The annualized volatility of the firm's daily stock return. We calculate the volatility over a one-year window and include all firm-years with at least 100 daily returns. The data are from the daily CRSP tapes. Table 3 . Column (1) shows the results from a discrete time-proportional hazard model (Cloglog, see Jenkins (2005) ). The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the firm exits the sample in the following period, and equal to zero otherwise. Columns (2) to (5) show the results from pooled multinomial logit regressions with standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. The exit reasons are those defined in Section 2-i.e., takeover (column 2), default (column 3), and other exits (column 4). Column (5) tests whether the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) (2) to (4) of Table 4 . Panel C controls for unobserved heterogeneity by implementing the nonparametric discrete-mixture model of Heckman and Singer (1984) . Finally, Panel D splits the sample into high-tech and low-tech firms with the classification proposed by Francis and Schipper (1999, p. 343) . To save space, we report only the coefficients of the age variables and the associated significance levels. Column 1 of each panel reports the results from a single-destination model (Cloglog) similar to that in column 1 of Table 4 . Columns 2 and 3 focus on takeover and failure hazard, respectively. They are based on pooled multinomial logit regressions with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with confidence 0. 
